Final diagnosis · synthesis of the 9 indicators
The worst fiscal deterioration in two decades, with a paradoxically healthy external front.
Colombia is not in open crisis — employment is at record lows, the current account is among the most balanced of the period, and foreign investment did not collapse. But it is going through its worst fiscal and international-credibility deterioration since the loss of the investment grade in 2021, and this time without a pandemic to explain it.
What improved (or held up) under Petro
- Current account: among the lowest of the period (~2.5% of GDP in 2025; 1.8% in 2024, its recent floor, versus the ~4–5% of Santos and Duque).
- No abrupt capital flight: there was no collapse in investment, but FDI did weaken —it fell to ~2.5% of GDP in 2025 (−16% year over year)—, it did not hold "steady".
- Unemployment at historic lows (8.9% in 2025, the lowest since 2001), though with precarious employment: 48.9% of those employed earn less than the minimum wage, and the share is rising.
- The peso appreciated sharply within the term, from a peak of ~$5,061 (Nov 2022) to ~$3,400 (Jun 2026).
What deteriorated
- Growth: the lowest of the period (~1.6% average versus Uribe's 4.6%).
- Fiscal deficit ~6.4% of GDP in 2025, with no COVID-type shock to justify it. Along with Brazil, Colombia is among the region's fiscal outliers (Peru, Chile and Mexico run well below).
- Fiscal rule suspended for three years: the credibility anchor voluntarily switched off.
- Rating: deeper into speculative grade (S&P BB-, Fitch BB); Moody's (Baa3) is the only thread holding the investment grade.
The comparative verdict
GROWTHUribe leads (~4.6%), with tailwinds from oil and democratic security.
CREDIBILITYSantos is the best era: he recovered and consolidated the investment grade and had the lowest fiscal deficit (~2.9%).
THE BLOWDuque lost the investment grade in 2021 (S&P and Fitch), aggravated by the pandemic.
LEGACYPetro inherits the worst of both —13% inflation and a post-COVID deficit— and does not correct it; his own stamp is fiscal disorder with the rule suspended, offset by the external adjustment, employment at record lows and real social gains (poverty at 28%, inequality declining, HDI rising).
The risk ahead
The thread is Moody's Baa3. A downgrade to Ba1 would trigger forced selling by funds with an investment-grade mandate, making credit even more expensive.
The cost has already risen: TES at 13–14% and debt interest at ~3.2% of GDP in 2026 (close to 5% if amortizations are added). Each point of deficit costs more than before.
The next government foots the bill: it inherits a structural fiscal gap of 3–4 points of GDP and rigid spending at 88% of the budget. The required adjustment would be among the largest in recent history.
The social read · the country behind the macro
The financial numbers hide the other half. Over 20 years poverty fell from ~50% to ~28% (DANE 2025) and homicides from 70 to ~26 per 100,000 —two enormous long-term achievements, predating this government—, but progress is uneven: inequality remains among the highest in the world (Gini 0.531 in 2025, though improving), more than half of employment is informal (~56%) and the perception of corruption worsened in 2025 (it fell to 37/100, −7 places according to Transparency International). Human development rises slowly regardless of who governs.
The reframing matters: unemployment at record lows loses its shine next to informality of 56% and the fact that nearly half earn less than the minimum wage; growth loses meaning next to a Gini that still distributes poorly what is produced; and "total peace" did not translate into less lethal violence —2025 was the decade's deadliest year for homicides in absolute terms. Under Petro, poverty and inequality eased appreciably, but security and corruption did not improve.
Interpretation caveat: inflation and the exchange rate are determined by the Banco de la República (independent) and global factors —oil prices, the Fed, the pandemic—, not the Executive alone. The terms have different durations (8 years for Uribe and Santos; 4 for Duque and Petro) and faced different shocks. This dashboard describes trajectories; it does not assign mechanical causality: a good or bad average does not imply that the sitting government caused it.
Promised vs. delivered · official targets against reality
"Reality wasn't what the plan expected": excuse or accountability?
Each government sets targets in its National Development Plan (PND) and in the Fiscal Framework (MFMP). The argument that "reality outran the plan" is partly valid —no plan foresaw the pandemic or the rate cycle— but it is also the whole point of accountability: plans must be realistic, and systematic optimism (especially fiscal) is itself a failure. Here each government is measured against its own PND —the same yardstick for all four—.
Two targets no government meets
None met it on average. Nuance: it is set by the central bank (independent), not the Executive.
The actual figure beats the target almost every year; 2024 closed at 6.7% (final figure) and 2025 at 6.4%. The CARF issued opinions over "rosy accounting".
The balanced read —same yardstick for all four: measured against its own PND, each government's picture is nuanced. Uribe delivered on his core (security, growth, inflation) and fell short on employment. Santos lifted 4.4 million out of poverty, but did not achieve the 6.2% growth he promised. Duque missed nearly all his targets, with the pandemic as a legitimate shock. Petro shows comparable lags —investment, housing, PND execution— but without a shock of COVID's magnitude. Thus "reality wasn't what was expected" is at once a partly valid defense and an admission that the plans —especially on the fiscal side— were too optimistic.
The legacy · what the incoming government inherits
A State with no free cash, addicted to non-recurring revenue, and facing one of the largest adjustments in recent history.
2026–2030 government · inauguration August 7, 2026 · second-round runoff of June 21, 2026 won by a narrow margin: 49.66% vs 48.70% (~1 point, Registraduría data)
The next government inherits a macroeconomy with no open crisis, but with public finances at their most strained point outside the pandemic. The arithmetic is unforgiving: almost the entire budget is committed by law, revenue falls short, refinancing the debt is expensive, and international credibility hangs on a single agency. This is what is in the safe on inauguration day.
The triple knot
CUTLower spending, but 88% is shielded by law or the Constitution: it cannot be cut without structural reforms.
COLLECTRaise revenue, but two tax reforms have already sunk in Congress and oil dividends are falling to less than half of 2024.
RECOVERRestore credibility —reactivate the rule, keep Moody's onside, preserve the IMF Flexible Credit Line— simultaneously and credibly.
What the markets will watch
If Moody's drops to Ba1, forced selling by funds with an investment-grade mandate kicks in: an immediate rise in the cost of credit.
The new government's first financial plan and tax bill: whether they bring concrete targets and measures, or more administrative mechanisms with no legal effect.
The sequence of reforms: a revenue (tax) reform is the priority; in parallel, adjusting spending requires touching the pension, labor and transfers reforms —all three costly in political capital.
The governability of the adjustment: a mandate won by ~1 point, a polarized country and a fragmented Congress limit the political capital for unpopular reforms. The "shrink the State" banner collides with the rigidity of the 88%.
Political note (neutral): the incoming government arrives with a stated program of spending restraint and fiscal discipline. Whether that intention translates into results depends less on willpower and more on three constraints that do not change with the color of the government: the legal rigidity of spending, the arithmetic of expensive debt, and the capacity to pass reforms in a divided Congress. This dashboard describes the economic legacy; it does not evaluate the incoming or outgoing government.
How to read these figures (no make-up)
- The average is misleading with extreme values. That is why each average card also shows the median, the range and, where applicable, the ex-pandemic average (excludes 2020–2021). Example: Duque's growth averages 3.5% but its median is 5.3% and its range runs from −7.2% to +10.8% — the average alone is not enough.
- The pandemic distorts Duque in growth, deficit, debt, unemployment and exchange rate. Much of his figures reflect the COVID shock, not discretionary decisions.
- Petro's term is incomplete. 2025 is provisional and 2026 a projection (dashed line, excluded from the averages). He also inherits the 13% inflation of 2022.
- Debt and the rating are not averaged: the change during the term is what is observed. Petro's debt looks flat partly because of the peso's appreciation and debt management, not because of a surplus.
- Exchange rate without a value judgment: a weak peso helps exporters and hurts importers. It is not colored as "good" or "bad".
- The social layer has series breaks. Poverty changed methodology in 2012 (hence the visual jump 2011→2012, which is not real); the corruption index changed scale in 2012; informality is measured differently depending on the period. Use the long-run trends, not the decimals.
- The recent HDI uses the HDR 2025 vintage. The years 2023–2026 reflect the UNDP's 2025 Human Development Report (2023 reference value: 0.788), with which Colombia rose from 91st to 83rd in the global ranking. The visual jump 2022→2023 is not a single-year improvement: it is the methodological rescaling the UNDP applies to its entire series in each report. Read the long-run trend, not the one-off jump.
- Figures updated to June 2026. Recent data were verified against the most recent official publications: final 2024 central-government deficit 6.7% and 2025 6.4% (Ministry of Finance); gross central-government debt end-2025 64.7% / net 58.5%; monetary poverty 2025 28.0% and Gini 0.531 (DANE, June 2026); FDI 2025 ~2.5% of GDP, declining (BanRep); corruption CPI 37/100 (CPI 2025, Transparency International); exchange rate ~$3,400 (June 2026). Where a figure changed relative to preliminary versions, the final official figure prevails.
- Debt is gross central-government debt, Ministry of Finance definition. The entire series uses the gross debt of the Central National Government from the Ministry of Finance's fiscal closings (the same as the MFMP, which includes the 2019 recognition of liabilities), anchored at 63.9% in 2024 and 64.7% in 2025. It is not net debt (lower: 58.5% in 2025, netting out assets), nor the Banco de la República series (~5–8 pp lower due to different coverage), nor General Government or IMF debt (higher). The historical series was audited year by year against this definition.
Sources: World Bank (WDI) · DANE (poverty, Gini, informality) · Banco de la República · Ministry of Finance (MFMP) · CARF · DNP / National Development Plan · National Planning Council (PND monitoring) · Medicina Legal / National Police (homicides) · UNDP (HDI) · Transparency International (CPI) · S&P / Fitch / Moody's · IMF · National Registraduría (electoral result, June 2026). Cutoff: June 2026. 2025 figures provisional; 2026 projected. Deficit and debt refer to the Central National Government. Series 2002–2021 compiled and rounded from official sources; recent years verified against 2025–2026 reports. Poverty, CPI and informality have methodological breaks (2012): compare trends, not decimals. The ratings are ordinal: the line is illustrative and the cards show the actual grades. Fedesarrollo's "highest deficit in 125 years" is a 2026 projection, not a fact.